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Living my narrative: Storying dishonesty and deception in mental health nursing  
 
Abstract  
This paper proceeds from MacIntyre’s moral philosophical perspective of individual human 
lives constituting unified narratives, in the context of co-evolving framing and guiding master 
narratives. This perspective accords specific episodes in people’s lives the status of significant 
component parts of their developing, storied and enacted individual histories. From this 
philosophical base, autoethnographic principles will be employed in providing accounts from 
my own professional life narrative strand as a mental health nurse educator that speak to the 
issue of institutionalised dishonesty and deception in mental health nursing education and 
practice. On the basis of my pre-existing experience of publishing in nursing journals and 
scholarly identity, my argument will proceed from contesting the idea of an imagined stable 
foundational professional ethos underpinning mental health nursing practice, against which 
to judge professional dishonesty and deception. Using illustrative, relatively recent short 
stories, drawn from my lived-experience base as a mental health nurse educator, I will argue 
throughout at implicit and explicit levels  that dishonesty and deception are always an 
inevitable part of the lives of mental health nurses and their educators. This is because of a 
constant gap between the nursing rhetoric and ideology that both groups espouse and how 
they actually behave on a day-to-day, mundane level, in and out of work and classroom 
practice. This gap shows up the public front of what mental health nursing is supposed to be 
about as dishonest and deceitful window dressing.  I will  assert that the use of more first 
person, lived experience accounts in mental health nursing teaching and publication are 
important educational resources in reducing this gap at professional practice, academic and 
informal levels. Such storied accounts may also be useful in  moving nurses and their educators 
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towards more morally and ethically sensitive, and reflexively-attuned positions around what 
they talk and write into existence. 
 
Keywords: Life Story, Mental Health, Nursing, Nursing Philosophy, Narrative, Narrative 
Ethics. 
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Introduction 
From a moral philosophical perspective, MacIntyre (1985) argues that a human life is a unified 
narrative embedded in a plurality of other narratives. In this context, a person’s life should 
not be seen as separate from the specific roles they assume throughout the time between 
their birth and death. Behaviours that form part of a unified narrative only make sense if 
human intentions are seen to be, or can be made, intelligible, and such behaviours depend 
on and will change according to shifting contexts of meaning grounded in specific life 
circumstances. In MacIntyre’s terms, meaning always derives from sets of pre-existing and 
subsequently developing narratives which, as metanarratives, provide templates for guiding 
the storied lives of individuals in their social and material worlds.  
 
This inevitably means that people extend, nuance and are caught up in – often in 
contradictory ways –  a messy plurality of narratives that dramatically co-evolve with their 
lives, in an open-ended and unpredictable fashion.  Such a process of continually storying and 
re-storying  lives ends for individuals with death. In their absence from life’s stage, the 
broader narratives in which they were embedded continue to co-evolve and mutate 
according to shifting historical contingencies and circumstances.  
 
In a dynamic and constantly shifting way, some metanarratives are implicated in implicitly or 
explicitly informing individual life stories and, equally, some are resisted against. From this 
perspective,  all human actions that form particular extended episodes, or strands of people’s 
lives are enacted, narrative histories,  ‘both of the individual concerned and of the settings in 
which they act and suffer’ (MacIntyre 1985, 211). Individuals are thus both agents and co-
authors in and of all aspects of their enacted lives, but are always only partially responsible 
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for shaping their personal narratives. Their stories can be interrupted, hijacked and co-opted 
into the stories of others, at individual, organisational and institutional levels, often in ways 
beyond their control. 
 
MacIntyre’s philosophy complements and provides depth for the activity of contemporary 
autoethnographic scholars. Eschewing the metanarrative of scientific objectivity, 
autoethnographers celebrate the contributions they make to social and human scientific 
inquiry on the basis of their lived-experience of episodes in their worlds as socially-, 
materially- and culturally-situated speakers (Richardson, 1997).  
 
The  above philosophical and social inquiry platform informs an extended episode in my life: 
I will describe in this paper my simultaneous ongoing storied engagement with and 
estrangement from mental health nursing education and practice. I will do so in the context 
of the institutionalised deception and dishonesty I see and experience in the gap between 
nursing rhetoric and ideology and how nurses and their educators actually behave on a day-
to-day, mundane level, in and out of work and classroom practice. In so doing, I will formally 
contribute to the developing story of my professional life as a nurse educator. Moreover, in 
deploying autoethnographic principles in constructing my paper, I will aspire to theoretical 
and methodological coherence and make a substantive contribution to my oeuvre within one 
of the significant storied communities to which I belong: autoethnographic inquiry (Short et 
al., 2013). 
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The invitation 
In late November, 2015, I receive an email inviting me to consider contributing to a special 
issue of the journal, Nursing Philosophy, devoted to ‘Dishonesty and Deception in Nursing’. I 
read the flyer and, on further invitation, speak to one of the guest editors. I express my 
concern that, although I am tempted to contribute a manuscript, as a longstanding member 
of editorial boards and as a past peer reviewer and article writer, I am in two minds about 
doing so. I tell him that I have grown wary of the editorial and representational practices, and 
article construction rules and expectations, that authors are faced with when they prepare 
qualitative research articles for mainstream nursing journals. In this context, I specifically 
mean that these practices, rules and expectations, while working well for papers informed by 
postpositivist and conventional qualitative methodologies,  militate against the novel and 
unusual forms of article construction proceeding from the experimental, poststructural, 
‘messy text’ and autoethnographic qualitative designs that I’ve long been associated with 
(Short et al., 2013). I share with him my belief that, in a kind of elective affinity with health 
and mental healthcare at a clinical level,  these practices, rules and expectations serve to 
maintain a status quo of normativity in privileging orthodox methodologies.  
 
In my view,  this is in itself a form of deception to the extent that these methodologies 
promote an ideological view of the world that rests on a fixed categorical divide between 
professional and patient or user identities, and normative practices. This conflicts with the 
critical methodological approaches I work within that both celebrate more messy, lived 
experience-based, conflated professional and user identity positions, and critique onto-
epistemological and practice orthodoxies. His response is reassuring however and, following 
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a further positive response from him after he read one of my recent autoethnographic papers, 
I proceed.  
 
As I work on this article, I read and re-read the flyer and the paper that inspired this special 
issue call. I am struck by the opening lines of the foreword to Lying to Ourselves (Wong and 
Gerras, 2015): ‘One of the hallmarks of a true profession is its ability to assess and regulate 
itself, especially with respect to adherence to its foundational ethos…’ It increasingly seems 
to me that both the flyer and the paper are based on bounded rational assumptions. From a 
storied life perspective, the idea of apparently desirable professional goals relating to an 
imagined fixed and stable foundational ethos of a profession falls down on the basis of the 
probability that ethical bases constantly mutate. In a dynamic way, they are likely to become 
regularly re-inscribed within the shifting formal and informal instrumental rational goals, and 
background cultural narratives, governing profession identity and behaviour at different 
points in space and time. This happens in a messy plurality of ways by the various stakeholders 
involved in ‘storying’ the life of a profession.  
 
So, with regard to mental health nursing, ‘instrumental rationality’ is always multiply 
nuanced, simultaneously serving the symbolic needs of ‘evidence-based practice’, local 
custom and practice, broader cultural influences, biomedicine and social control, and the 
maintenance of ongoing social relationships, in contradictory ways. This state of affairs will 
inevitably function to undermine the coherence and integrity of any attempt to present a 
public front of an overarching stable metanarrative of a profession, and is well illustrated in  
the following accounts. These illustrate my growing discontent around teaching and 
associating with mental health nurses over the last two decades. 
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Championing hybrid scholarship 
In recent years, I have had to struggle with teaching mental health nurses according to a policy 
and professional driven curricula at odds with my developing scholarship in narrative inquiry 
(Grant et al., 2011, 2013), narrative competence (Corbally and Grant, 2016), relational 
autoethnography (Grant et al., 2015) and demedicalizing mental health (Grant, 2015).  
 
I am one of a small number of people committed to championing reflexive subjective, first 
person, lived-experience and autoethnographic writing in mental health. My scholarship aims 
to provocatively expose the gaps between mental health nursing rhetoric and ideology (in 
institutional terms, what nursing is supposed to be about)  and the lived experience of 
survivors and practitioners – the latter always giving the lie to the former. 
 
My work does not support or represent absolute categorical distinctions between mental 
health ‘practitioners’, ‘users’, ‘survivors’ and ‘academics’, since I embody all of these 
identities simultaneously in my writing and teaching. Borrowing a term from postcolonial 
scholarship, I maintain a hybrid standpoint position as a mental health academic-ex-
practitioner-survivor of the UK institutional mental health system (Grant et al., 2015). These 
personal descriptors shift around the hyphens, depending on which aspect or aspects of my 
identity, or which particular story of myself and my concerns, I’m privileging in my academic 
presentations and writing at any one time. 
 
So, I find myself constantly teaching and writing against the grain of the mental health nursing 
curricular content and clinical practice, both of which rest on categorical distinctions between 
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nurses and service users or patients, and a knowledge base that supports these distinctions. 
This lack of fit between my evolving scholarly identity and onto-epistemological curricular and 
practice assumptions has led me to develop a growing antipathy towards the institution of 
mental health nursing. This has grown steadily, year on year,  more especially since my 
negative experiences as an in-patient in an acute mental health ward ten years ago (Grant, 
2011).  
 
The dinner party 
I thus experienced the contradictions between professional and educational rhetoric and 
displays of disparaging and ‘othering’ accounts of students and qualified staff about the 
people they purport to be in the business of caring as deeply offensive. They could be talking 
about me in my days as an acute ward patient, and some once were. However, I am by no 
means free of blame in this regard.   
 
At a recent social event, I spent the evening with a group of mental health nurse educators. 
Over dinner, we shared nostalgic stories of our times as student mental health nurses back in 
the 1970s and 80s. One of my companions described the first time he’d met a patient after 
the latter’s recent lobotomy. His graphic description of how this seemed to change the shape 
of the patient’s head and facial features is met with guffaws by my companions. I joined in 
with the laughter. 
 
Later at my home, I became pre-occupied with lots of conflicting thoughts and feel a mixture 
of mild self-disgust and bitter irony over the fact that my collusion in storying patients in 
‘othering’ and abusive ways sat badly with my narrative ethical standpoint and current 
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scholarly purpose. I had also shared one or two patient anecdotes, breaking my own rules in 
the interests of maintaining bonhomie, and co-constructing a group identity through the use 
of humour.  
 
This account is illustrative of my being constantly troubled by a question that never goes away 
for me: why are many mental health nurses and others working in mental health, myself 
included from time-to-time, complicit with such practices?  
 
From Arendt to Socrates: thoughtlessness and the banality of evil 
Wong and Gerras (2015) describe the mismatch between public adulation of US military 
personnel as moral exemplars and their institutionalised engagement in deceitful practices 
that escape the public gaze. Their writing resonates with my growing antipathy towards 
mental health nursing. This is based on the gap between my lived-experience as an educator 
and past service user and the ways in which mental health nursing publicly and professionally 
promotes itself as a trustworthy institution at all levels, in terms of its rituals, principles, 
assumptions and related educational and practice activities. 
 
The fact that the precise nature of the forms of professional complicity with reprehensible 
cultural practices shift as a function of time and place demands serious sociocultural 
consideration. In regard to nursing, Roberts and Ion (2014) recently spoke to the need for 
such critical analysis from an Arendtian perspective. Arendt (1992) asserted that 
organisational socialisation and habituation to their engagement in such practices leaves 
many of the people involved, by default as complicit perpetrators, untroubled. Her  ‘banality 
of evil’ argument is that the mass participation by otherwise ordinary people in acts that later 
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attract retrospective social and cultural condemnation does not imply an essentially wicked 
character on the part of most of the people involved.  
 
However, in the wake of scandals perpetrated in the name of care, whether  at a major, large 
scale level or in more minor and banal, but no less insidious, forms of day-to-day routinised 
abuses, I often witness nurses, nurse educators and others defensively invoking the ‘few bad 
apples’ argument. They do this in spite of current literature that points to the need to consider 
these issues in ways that do justice to their systemic and social psychological complexities 
(Payley, 2014; Traynor et al., 2014). ‘Bad apple’ understandings represent a variant of 
‘othering’; a kind of verbal NIMBY (not in my backyard) stance, where rogue individuals or 
practice locations are implicitly storied as ‘not like us’, not representative of the general mass 
of ethically attuned, caring nurses. Arendt (1971) suggested the opposite: that participation 
in such events is a constant possibility for everyone. 
 
She argued that this is because of a tendency for ‘thoughtlessness’ to become 
institutionalized on a large scale. In her terms, thoughtlessness is a kind of routinized inability 
to think that serves the interests of instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality is 
characterised by unquestioning adherence to cultural rules and expectations in order to 
achieve maximal organisational efficiency in relation to cultural goals. From an Arendtian 
position, Roberts and Ion (2014) argue quite rightly that neoliberal instrumental rationality 
has become increasingly prevalent in our healthcare organisations in recent years, informing 
and shaping the activities and professional identities of contemporary nurses of all branches. 
However, from a storied life perspective, nurses’ complicity with such practice imperatives 
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has arguably taken many shifting culture- and time-specific forms since the advent of 
institutional psychiatric practice.  
 
I find myself allied with Roberts and Ion in my longstanding concern about the function of 
neoliberal instrumental rationality in the UK and elsewhere in compromising undergraduate 
mental health nursing curricula (Grant 2014). There is a continual tension between explicit 
higher educational curricula that might be delivered provocatively on the basis of Socratic 
discussion and implicit service curricula associated with training in the service of 
organisational business-as-usual (Grant and Radcliffe, 2015).  
 
In this context, Arendt (1971) distinguished between those who are socialised into and engage 
in institutionally- and organisationally-sanctioned thoughtlessness and those who refuse this. 
Positioning Socrates as a seminal role model in this regard, she advocated a critically 
interrogative approach to that which is taken for granted in life (and by implication and 
extension current mental health nursing higher education and practice). This functions to 
disrupt habituated thoughtless participation in morally reprehensible practices. In such an 
approach, thinking, writing and related teaching are positioned as acts of resistance; as 
embodied, enacted ethics in the service of storying morally desirable practices into existence. 
 
The lecture 
Recently, I prepared for a lecture that I was scheduled to present to a group of second year 
mental health nursing  students at a university in a different geographical location from where 
I live and work.  While preparing, I was  aware of a growing background anxiety in anticipation 
of the event. I was particularly concerned about a sound clip on my powerpoint, which was 
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of a reading from one of my autoethnographies of my time spent as a patient in an NHS acute 
mental health ward a decade or more ago (Grant, 2011). The clip described the content of the 
abusive voices I heard while psychotic, potentially suicidal and under close observation. 
 
Before I played the clip, I set the contextual scene for the students. This was around 
mainstream institutional psychiatry’s business-as-usual style of responding to people who 
hear voices, which endorses disrespectful and unhelpful mental health nursing attitudes and 
interactions with service users.  
 
Without identifying where the clip came from or the identity of the person being described, I 
turned it on: 
 
…The man in the sideroom is 52…He has had a prolonged episode of hearing voices 
and (experiencing) false beliefs… The voices appear to come from outside of him 
and are loud. They shout: 
 
  ‘Kill yourself, you bastard…You worthless heap of shit’…. 
       (Grant 2011, 126) 
 
As I anticipated, the swear words triggered defensive laughter among some of the younger 
students, betraying their discomfort. When this died down I asked for their responses to the 
sound clip. These were informed exclusively by the disease paradigm, such as ‘I’d feel sorry 
for this man as he’s clearly ill’, and ‘these are symptoms of severe mental illness and he needs 
treatment’. Some of the students were still in their teens and, perhaps understandably, 
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expressed fear and uncertainty around the best ways to engage with someone in that 
circumstance. 
 
I then disclosed to the students that I was describing my own lived-experience, and that 
during my time on the acute ward none of the nurses there seemed interested in spending 
time or talking with me, apart from observing me in silence. 
 
At that point, an earnest looking student mental health nurse, who looked to be a little older 
than the rest of the group and had been attentive to me since the start of my lecture, spoke 
up. ‘We are taught to be careful not to engage with people’s hallucinations and delusions, 
because doing so serves to reinforce them.’ I found myself bristling a little, partly in response 
to his biomedical vocabulary in contrast to mine, and because his comment betrayed the 
normative and anachronistic assumptions informing his education. With measured authority, 
I replied: ‘What you’re being taught is 20-30 years out of date. The opposite is in fact regarded 
as the most helpful thing to do these days.’  
 
I advised him and the others to read psychosocial paradigm work from Kinderman (2014), 
Read and Dillon (2013) and my edited narrative work (Grant et al., 2011), around the need to 
engage with people and their accounts of their voices, their beliefs about where these come 
from and how they are triggered, their significance in terms of early traumas, and the role of 
institutional psychiatric settings in compounding rather than alleviating such problems. I 
talked about Jacqui Dillon’s work in the Hearing Voices UK network (Read and Dillon, 2013) 
and the more formal cognitive therapy approaches for voice hearing and false beliefs 
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(Morrison et al., 2003), again including my own edited work in this area, written by my ex-
cognitive therapy students (Mills,2008; Mulhern, 2010). 
 
I invited the group to make further, final comments on the audio clip. A student asked ‘it must 
be difficult for you, to talk about your own experiences like that?’ Aware of the mixture of 
empathy and social judgement implicit in her question, I replied: ‘writing and talking about 
my experiences is not difficult, as I’ve managed to integrate them into my personhood over 
the years and I believe it is ethically appropriate to share them in the context of my narrative 
work and hybrid identity position…’. I later thought that had I been a little less controlled in 
my response, I could have added ‘sharing my experiences is not the problem for me. The 
predictable, anachronist and judgemental reactions of people in, or preparing to take their 
place in, the mental health professions is, however’.  
 
 
Making sense of my stories 
In making sense of the experiences and accounts I have described above from the perspective 
of  storied life and identity,  I am struck by a number of issues. To borrow from Goffman 
(1959),  my stories describe the tensions between frontstage and backstage professional 
narrative enactment and the ways in which I am inevitably implicated in these tensions – true 
as much for the US military (Wong and Gerras, 2015) as it is for storying user and professional 
lives within mental health nursing practice and education. 
 
As meta-autoethnography  (using autoethnographic principles to describe my previously 
published autoethnographic and related work and identity), I have storied myself in this 
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paper, as I have in most of my writing, as a credible and well-published scholar in critical and 
marginal,  lived-experience onto-epistemological domains. This in itself is a rhetorical 
representational device that sometimes seduces me, and may seduce possible readers, into 
believing that I mostly occupy the narrative moral high ground. 
 
By describing how I write and teach against mainstream institutional mental health nursing 
educational, clinical and representational practices, I have written myself squarely and rather 
excitingly (for me at any rate) into new and emerging critical paradigms. My professional life 
story style is of expressing antipathy to normative,  anachronistic and thoughtless rule-
following practices, while being immersed in them as a  mental health nurse educator. This 
positions me as a kind of micro- and macro-organisational trickster,  ‘fifth columnist’ or latter 
day knight-errant figure, whose assumed and combative scholarly role is to expose morally 
questionable off-duty and classroom practice. This is of course fully justifiable in terms of my 
autoethnographic storied identity and purpose, which is to use storytelling critically,  
politically and strategically in the service of resistance to dominant and hegemonic, but 
ultimately oppressive, cultural practices. 
 
But what drives all of these aspects of my storied life? Since my days of being diagnosed and 
treated in the UK institutional psychiatric system, I am constantly sensitised and resistant to  
what I have previously described as ‘narrative entrapment’ (Grant et al., 2015): being stuck in 
the unwanted and unwelcome stories that mental health professionals, including nurses, may 
tell about me. And yet, ironically, I employ othering representational practices in order to 
‘story up’ my narrative virtue. I do so in the service of constantly policing the boundaries and 
16 
 
integrity of my own lived story in a landscape of competing narratives which, although 
contested and rejected by me,  I am always written into in various ways. 
 
Conclusion 
That said, the utility of autoethography in critiquing professional cultures from an applied 
philosophical position has, I believe, much to offer in the ongoing storying of life. Publishing 
the lived experiences of nurses and their educators caught in the tensions between 
professional and public rhetoric and subjectively experienced lived-deception and dishonesty 
can contribute greatly to a developing metanarrative of nursing as an increasingly more 
transparently and coherently honest discipline.  
 
Dishonesty and deception are, I believe, always and inevitably part of our lives in terms of our 
storied inscription within contradictory and  constantly co-evolving and mutating master 
narratives. I read my own professional nurse educator life as a continual striving to negotiate 
with some integrity  my own story through such a landscape, where sanitised public- and 
professionally-facing ideological rhetoric co-exists with implicit organisational narratives 
(Richardson, 1997; Smircich, 1983). The former, more formal set is evident in policy, 
professional and research texts, while the less formal latter is enacted in the conversations 
and actions of nurses in and out of work and classroom time. The former set usually aspires 
to a level of professional and, currently, evidence-based practice that is generally not realised 
in an adequate way in either practice or classroom. The latter betrays the local organisational 
and wider cultural values-based,  often anachronistic, forms of custom and practice, which 
constantly undermine the former.  I consequently experience ideological rhetoric and implicit 
organisational narratives as riven with dishonesty and deception. 
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Both are explicitly othering, based on an assumed and constantly reified divide between 
professional nurse and disordered service user. Further, both constitute variants of 
instrumental rationality in that they function simultaneously, in an incoherent way, to 
socialise and discipline nurses into adherence with mismatched goals. Nurses have to balance 
the competing demands of frontstage professional and public impression management while 
fitting in what is organisationally, culturally and socially valued in their local work setting. 
 
It seems to me that more first person, lived-experience accounts will also bring into sharper 
focus the issue of narrative ethics (Adams, 2008), in the tensions and contradictions between 
and within formal and informal mental health nursing representational practices. In Arendtian 
terms, storytelling is arguably an important and much needed Socratic educational tool in 
reducing the gap between nursing rhetoric and lived experience. This may help nurses and 
their educators develop the necessary levels of critical reflexivity to more readily challenge 
the forms of curricular-retarding thoughtlessness that they are socialised into, and better 
sensitise them to the constantly incoherent nature of their storied location and identities.  In 
this regard, clearly some stories are always going to be more morally and ethically appealing 
than others.  In reducing the gap between what we practice and what we preach, we need to 
increase our sensitivities around what we talk and write into existence. 
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